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Abstract 
In this paper the two canonical theories of the firm - transaction costs economics and the 
knowledge-based view of the firm – predictions on ‘make-or-buy’ are tested on the news 
industry.  The news industry provides an interesting case on which to test the two theories since 
it is characterized by a high degree of urgency. Urgency refers to the need to catch and process 
inputs fast. A tendency that is becoming more widespread in other industries where the 
production cycle tends to be reduced. The test is don on original data on the newspaper industry 
collected by the author. The conclusions drawn are that that newspapers are organized differently 
than is predicted from the knowledge-based view of the firm and transaction cost economics. 
The newspapers do no specialize in core competencies measured in terms of topics covered. On 
the contrary, a precondition for outsourcing is well-developed competencies in house. The 
widespread use of integration cannot either be explained as a solution to hold up either, such as 
transaction cost economics predicts.  The reason behind has to be sought in urgency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This is an empirically oriented paper. The aim is to test and discuss transaction cost 
economics’ (Williamson 1989, 1996, Coase 1937, Klein Crawford and Alchian 1978) and 
the knowledge-based view of the firm’s (Pralalad and Hamel 1990, Quinn and Hilmer 1994, 
Loasby 1999) explanations of ‘make-or-buy’ on the news industry, more specifically when 
newspapers ‘make-or-buy’ an article. The theories are chosen because they are canonical in 
the sense that they are dominating the theoretical field (Poppo and Zenger 1998, Foss and 
Langlois 2002, Combs and Ketchen 1999).  Testing them empirically is needed because 
there is a highly developed theoretical explanation of ‘make-or-buy’ (Manhke et al. 2003, 
Veugelers and Cassiman 1999), which has only seldom been tested on intellectual 
production characterized by a high degree of urgency. The newspaper industry was chosen 
mainly for three reasons:  
i) It is an industry characterized by a high degree of urgency. Urgency is 
manifest in the newspaper industry in two ways. First, events that have to be covered are 
often evaporating fast. This means that the newspapers have to be fast on the spot to be able 
to write about it afterwards. This is urgency in acquisition. Second, articles covering events 
often have to be published fast after the event has happened. Delays in publication will 
reduce the value of the article. This is urgency in use. The question of urgency will be taken 
up in chapter two. 
ii) It is public who produces each article – apart from editorials – and the 
newspapers included in the study have provided information of the contractual relationship 
between them and the journalistsi. Hence, I have information on this contractual relationship 
for all the produced articles included in the sample in this study. Thus the newspaper 
industry provides an exceptionally good case for testing ‘make-or-buy’ questions on micro-
level.  
iii) The news industry is one of the industries that has had most years to 
experiment with the organization of production characterized by a high degree of urgency, 
both in acquisition and in use, hence it is not unlikely that organization of the industry 
carries the fruit of decades of knowledge accumulation on coping with urgency.ii  
 The testing/discussion is done on original quantitative and qualitative data collected by 
the author on the Danish newspaper industry in 2001. The quantitative data set includes 
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articles and notices from four Danish morning newspapers in week 14 2001. Measured in 
numbers of firms these firms cover more than 66,7 percentage of the market for omnibus 
newspapers in Denmark.iii Measured in circulation (2. half of 1999) – based on so-called 
accountancy corrected circulation numbers collected by Dansk Oplagskontrol (member of 
The International Federation of Audit Bureau of Circulation) – 70,2 percentage of the 
circulation is produced by the firms included in my population. The qualitative data are 
based on qualitative interviews with editors on the included newspapers, editors in other 
types of written pressiv magazines and interviews (plus email communication) with branch 
organizationsv. 
 The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. First, I present the two canonical 
theories of the firm’s explanations on ‘make-or-buy’. ‘Make-or-buy’ is contextualized to the 
news industry. This is followed by a presentation of what is meant by urgency. It is 
documented by examples from the newspaper industry. Afterwards the method behind the 
data collection is presented, and then I turn to the statistical findings on the use of the three 
alternative governance structures. Following this I discuss the correspondence between the 
empirical findings and the two canonical theories of the firm. Finally, I present an 
explanation as to why we find a different use of the alternative governance structures than 
those predicted by the canonical theories.     
  
2. Urgency and how it appears in the News Industry 
 
In the introduction I suggested that urgency is important in the news industry, thus I will 
return to the questions: How is urgency different from temporal specificity and does it 
appear in the news industry? Urgency is related to temporal specificity (Masten et al. 1991, 
Nickerson and Silverberg 1999, Williamson 1989) as it is used in transaction cost 
economics. The unit of analysis is the transaction. Temporal specificity refers to the fast loss 
of values of assets in a specific relation (Masten et al. 1991, Nickerson and Silverberg 1999, 
Williamson 1989). The loss is generated by the hold up that is made possible because of 
temporal dependency of either the subcontractor on the customer or the customer on the 
subcontractor.  Urgency refers to the fast loss of value the asset in all (potential) 
relationships or to the loss of opportunity costs of not being able to invest in an asset fast. 
Not because of hold up but because the firm – being either subcontractor or customer – 
failed to catch the value of an input before it evaporated (Choudhury and Sampler 1997) or 
  
3
 
before it was used by a competitor. In the news industry temporal specificity refers to i) the 
potentials a freelance journalist have to make a hold up on the newspaper by threatening to 
delay his submission of an article; ii) the potential the editor have to make a hold up on a 
freelance journalist by threatening not to publish his article after it has been written unless 
the freelance journalist accepts a lower price than originally agreed upon. Urgency refers to 
that i) the article the freelance journalist has produced loses value to all newspapers if it is 
not published the day after it has been written; ii) that the journalist – being in house or 
freelance – has to cover a certain event fast to get the needed input to write an article. 
Urgency is manifest in two ways: in acquisition and in use (Choundbury and Sampler 1997). 
Urgency in acquisition refers to that an event that is happening needs to be captured and to 
be transformed into an article fast since the event is disappearing. This could be coverage of 
a bank robbery. The newspapers need to send a journalist and a photographer to the scene of 
the crime fast to be able to get good pictures and interviews with witnesses. Urgency in use 
refer to that the articles needs to be produced fast after the event has occurred since either 
because the event will be covered by other newspapers or because it simply has lost interest 
to the newspapers (because they assume it has lost interest to their readers).  
Moreover, to qualify as an urgent event a high degree of unpredictability needs 
to be present. If the event can be predicted the journalist have to work fast. This does not 
refer to urgency but only to the high pace of the work. Hence, urgency refers to the fast 
response to the unpredictable. This means that if the newspapers know in advance that an 
event occurs two weeks later that requires immediate attention – at that time – then it is not 
urgency. When unpredictability is present the newspapers cannot know in advance when and 
where an event of a certain type is happening that needs urgent attention. I am not 
suggesting that all articles are equally urgent in character. Most topics of the articles 
produced are characterized by a certain degree of urgency either in acquisition or in use.vi 
Concerning urgency in acquisition. If the news section of a newspaper has 50 articles, it 
might be reasonable to say that 10-15 are articles on prescheduled events or follow up on 
earlier articles, 10-20 are articles on events that could be predicted by competent editors or 
journalists and the rest are radically new which is characterized by a high degree of urgency. 
However, this situation is in contrast to the culture and sport section in the newspapers 
where only around 10 percent of the articles are not reviews of book or films, which are 
prescheduled. Concerning urgency in use it is generally the case in the news industry that 
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the articles loose value fast either because the event covered is less ‘hot’ or because 
competitors has covered the event. However, this is usually less the case in culture and 
science topics that in most other topics.  
 
3. Make or Buy options in the News Industry 
 
What does ‘make-or-buy’ mean in the newspaper industry? A continuum of contract types is 
used in the news industry; that is different versions of ‘make-or-buy’ exists. They range 
from employment contracts to spot market contracts. As made clear by Coase (1937) and 
Simon (1951) an employee is an agent hired on an input-contract – in the sense that is 
stipulated the temporal input - that accepts the principal’s right to use direction within a zone 
of acceptance.vii The contracts remains rather unspecified concerning the task to be 
undertaken by the employee. Moreover, the agent accepts that the residual income belongs 
to the firm (Grosmann and Hart 1986). Typically, employee contracts in the newspaper 
industry are based on pure input contracts with a fixed salaryviii; occasionally they include 
elements of the output contract – contracts where the payment is based on the output/the 
product - where firms use bonuses in addition to the fixed salary. The newspapers also use 
relational contracting (Williamson 1986); in the trade known as permlance contracts. These 
contracts focus on the terms of the relationship rather than specifying the product in great 
details, neither is the termination date spelled out. Permlance contracts, as they are called in 
the news industry, are typically based on an intention of a long lasting relationship, where 
the permlancer has access to the firm’s strategic knowledge (including access the 
newspapers intranet when existing). The contract also specifies the topic the permlancer is 
going to cover. Usually, the contract guarantees a certain minimum monthly payment to the 
journalist as long as he produces a minimum number of articles (quality is unspecified). The 
rights to use direction are not specified but usually the contracts include a reference stating 
the journalist must not work for competitors while working for the firm. Procedures for 
acceptance of articles that exceeds the agreed minimum are not specified in the contract. 
Typically, additional articles from perm lancers are accepted automatically. The newspapers 
also use three different types of freelancers. The different freelancers share that they are not 
having guaranties of minimum monthly payment; and formally the newspaper does not have 
any formal direction rights over them. They are paid per article. It is common that the 
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contracts are only verbal. One type of freelance is one with a longer affiliation with the 
newspaper where he has ‘monopoly’ rights to publish within a given topic in the newspaper; 
for example reviews of Latin American literature. Books are sent to him and he decided 
whether to write the article or not. If he decides to write the article it will almost always be 
published. Contracts do not specify anything on knowledge and information sharing 
between the newspaper and the freelance journalist. Typically, the editor and journalist 
communicate and occasionally the journalist gets feedback from the editor concerning the 
article he has written.ix He might participate in a meeting – or similar – with other free- and 
permlancers working for the newspaper once a year. A second type of freelancers is the one 
who make an agreement with the editor to write a particular article. He does not need to 
have any monopoly right, nor does he need to have any long lasting relationship with the 
newspaper. A third type is a freelance journalist that sends his articles to the editor without 
prior agreements. In the following these types are collapsed into employees, perm lancers 
and freelancers and are seen as empirical manifestations of their theoretical equivalents, 
being respectively hierarchy, network and market.  
 
4. ‘Make-or- Buy’  – the Canonical Theories 
- and what it means for making or buying an article 
The theories of the firm can be divided into two types: transaction cost economics and the 
knowledge-based view. The aim of this section is to present their respective theoretical 
explanations on ‘make-or-buy’. These are contextualized to the news industry and its 
characteristics: more specifically, to the ‘making-or- buying’ of articles (with by-line).x 
 
4.1. Transaction cost economics and the ‘Make-or-Buy’ question 
 
In Williamson’s (1985, 1989, 1991, 1996) version of transaction cost economics the core 
question is whether an investment made by an agents leads to hold up. The agent considers 
making an investment that he knows can only at high costs be used in another relationship. 
Due to uncertainty and bounded rationality a complete contract cannot be written.  
Specifying exact prices, conditions of delivery, and so forth, needs to be changed in the 
future. Both parties are aware that adjustments are necessary. If they write as many 
conditions into the contracts as they can possible think of it makes the contract less flexible. 
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Thus, the customer can break the contract with reference to that the subcontractor did not 
live up to what was specified in the contract. If it is specified in the contract that the 
customer can dissolve the contract if delivery of a good or service is delayed in for example 
two days (which has been written into the contract for reasons of incentives) the customer 
can use this clause to have the contract renegotiated. Alternatively, a contract can be under 
specified which gives similar possibilities for canceling the contract. In this case the contract 
will be cancelled because the subcontractor does not live up to the quality as it is defined by 
customer or delivers at the time the customer decides, for example. The result in both cases 
will be renegotiations. The renegotiations will, however, be done in a different situation than 
the initial contract was made since the subcontractor has made relation specific investments 
after signing the now dissolved contract. In the initial situation the subcontractor had the 
possibility to make different investments and find different customers. The lowest price he 
would accept would be determined on his alternative options. The highest price the customer 
would accept is one resulting in a normal return on his investment. In between these two 
positions an agreement on the price will be reached where both partners will get at least a 
sufficient payment/price that they will not use their alternative options. However, when the 
contract is being renegotiated, the subcontractor will be interested in having covered as 
much of his relationship specific investments, which will be close to sunk costs if no new 
contract is signed. Thus he is willing to accept an offer that is significantly lower than in the 
initial contract.  The price just needs to be better than if he has to carry the total loss himself. 
Since the subcontractor can predict this scenario he will not make relation specific 
investments. He might offer to make an investment in a general-purpose machine or similar, 
which is less efficient than a machine tailored to the specific relationship. Judged from an 
economical perspective it is, Williamson argues, an inefficient solution compared to the 
investment with a high degree of asset specificity. The general investment will either not be 
able to produce the needed quality or only at higher costs than what can be achieved by a 
specific investment. Hence, the aim is to create incentives for the subcontractor to make the 
relation specific investment. This is done by reducing the hold up-possibilities. Hold up is, 
for example, being reduced, if the customer buys a certain part of the shares in the 
subcontractors firm or by guaranteeing a certain minimum purchase that makes the 
investment at least breakeven. Nevertheless, there are investments that cannot be solved 
through such arrangements; hence integration is needed. Integration eliminates the 
  
7
 
incentives for hold up since the firm will not gain anything from making a hold up itself. 
Hold up can also occur if the customer needs to make investment involving a high degree of 
specificity which depends on a ‘difficult to replace’ subcontractors input. The solutions 
follow those specified above but the incentive questions is on reducing the subcontractors 
hold up possibilities; if this cannot be achieved integration is the preferred solution.   
Alternatively, hold up can be made possible because of temporal specificity (Masten et al, 
1991, Lafontaine and Masten 2002, Nickerson and Silverberg 1999, Williamson 1989, 
Pirrong 1993) Temporal specificity does not refer to asset specificity in the most narrow 
sense (Lafontaine and Masten 2002); hence not to the subcontractor’s hesitations towards 
investing, but to situations where customer is dependent on that the subcontractor delivers at 
a certain time. The subcontractor can then threaten to delay the delivery unless receiving a 
higher payment. The subcontractor can then increase his payment to just below the loss the 
customer would gain from not receiving the goods or service at a certain time. A reverse 
situation where the subcontractor is temporally dependent on the customer is also possible. 
The principle is the same as described above.  
To sum up integration occurs either because the subcontractor needs to make specific 
investments that allow the customer to make or hold on him (or vice versa) or because the 
subcontractor can make a hold up because of the customer’s losses, if he does not receive 
the good at a certain time (or vice versa). 
Contextualized to the ‘make-or-buy’ an article-question one can argue that i) integration 
occurs when the subcontractor (free- or permlance journalist) needs to make investments 
either in certain skills that are specific to that newspaper or undertake research in a topic 
which is only covered by this particular newspaper, since this allow the customer to make a 
hold up on him; ii) integration occurs in newspapers because the subcontractor (free- or 
perm lance journalist) can threaten to delay the submission of his article unless he receives 
additional payment.    
 
4.2 Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm and ‘Make-or- Buy’ 
 
Explaining the ‘make-or-buy’ from a knowledge-based view of the firm is complicated since 
no dominant school exists. The knowledge-based view of the firm has been associated with 
the so-called resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1986, 1991, 1991, Rumelt, 1984; 
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Wernerfelt, 1984). This theory applies the firm’s resources as the unit of analysis (Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) and argues that firms possess numerous resources, but it is the 
resources, that are unique, inimitable, non-substitutable and rare, which are the basis for 
competitive advantage (Barney 1986, 1991, 1999). Knowledge in this theory is just another 
resource with which the firm is endowed. This association is not adequate. From a 
knowledge-based approach this Richardian-approach is only helpful in identifying what 
characterizes knowledge valuable to a firms sustained competitive advantage. Hence, it is 
argued, what is needed is a theory that explains the make or buy-question based on a 
Smithian approach explaining the learning (dis)advantages of specialization (Loasby 1999, 
Smith 1776). In other words a learning-approach to ‘make-or-buy’. In transaction costs 
economics the market is supposed to be the chosen mechanism for coordination unless hold 
up-problems occur. In the knowledge-based approach no such a priories exists. The starting 
unit is the division of labor between individuals. The individual who specializes in fewer 
tasks can focus his learning, thus improve the efficiency by developing new tools and 
techniques, as argued by Smith (1776). Firms can also improve their efficiency by focusing 
their learning; this means that firms shall specialize in production where they have 
comparative learning advantages. Firms can then take advantage of their own learning 
environments and engage in networks relationships with subcontractors that will be able to 
deliver a cheaper or better product due to the learning advantages associated with their 
specialization. In the newspaper industry one should expect the individual newspapers to 
specialize – in the sense of in- house production – in the topic where they have an advantage 
over other newspapers and agencies. I suggest that the topics where they hold specialization 
advantages are those in which they are specialized; hence the topics in which one should 
expect them to have in house can be calculated through using a revealed specialization index 
(see below). Subsequently, the newspapers would be expected to buy articles covering 
topics outside their main specialization area from agencies or free- or permlance journalists. 
xi 
 
5. Data collection and Methods 
 
The data set includes articles from four Danish morning newspapers. Measured in numbers 
of firms these firms cover more than 66,7 percentage of the market for omnibus newspapers 
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in Denmark. Measured in circulation (second half of 1999) – based on so-called 
accountancy corrected circulation numbers collected by Dansk Oplagskontrol (a member of 
The International Federation of Audit Bureau of Circulation) – 70,2 percentage of the 
circulation is produced by the firms included in my population. The total number of 
circulation is 562560 copies and included in my sample is 394857 copies.  
I collected data on the use of the three different governance structures within these firms, or 
more narrowly on the use of the governance structures involved in writing the articles.xii The 
data on the governance structures were collected by mapping the articles of the four 
newspapers in week 14 and 2001. The total population of articles included in the study was 
1622 articles.  These articles were used to generate a random but stratified sample on which 
I could get the data on the ‘employment-status’ on the included journalists. The sample 
included 266 articles.xiii They are distributed with 206 articles from large newspapers (large 
firms = readership larger than 500.000, non-large firms readership < 100.000, nothing in 
between) and 60 from non-large newspapers. I mapped the by-line, genre, topic and 
geographical location of the topic of the article. The by-line is used to get employment data 
on the journalist. Genre is used as a proxy for skill-intensity. Genre is dichotomized into 
analytical and news articles. Writing analytical articles requires topic-specialization (equals 
skill intensity). This is not the case for news articles.xiv Genres are use in generating 
hypothesis about external learning advantages. Topic is used for two purposes: i) 
differentiating between urgent and low-urgent topics and ii) identifying firms revealed 
specialization patterns, which are used to discuss the core-competence prediction. The 
geography variable is used to discuss whether geography influences the efficiency of the 
‘make-or-buy’.  
The included variables are only used to identify the distribution of the 
governance structures; they do not include explanatory variables as such. Explanations of 
the distribution of governance structures are based on qualitative interviews with editors.  
First, I identify the distribution in the use of the three governance structures in the sample as 
such, dichotomized into large and non-large firms as well as for the individual firms. To 
avoid problems related to consistency the sample is always weighted. These data are used to 
give a general presentation of the ‘make-or-buy’ in the newspaper industry. Secondly, I 
identified the distribution in the use of the three governance structures in genres and thirdly 
in respect to ‘geography’. These data provides the background for the testing/discussion of 
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transaction cost economics since the allow me to identify differences between topics with a 
high or low degree of temporal specificity as well as how transportation time affects how 
newspapers deal with temporal specificity. Forth, I identify the genres. This links to 
knowledge-based view of the firm predictions about specialization advantages/focus on core 
competencies. 
Forth, I identified if we can find specialization/governance structure patterns. 
This is done in the following way. First, a specialization index (SI) is being calculated: 
 
SI=
x
x
x
x
p
t
p
j
i
t
i
j  
xij = firm i’s production of articles in topic j 
xit  = firm i’s total production of articles t 
xpj  = sample p’s production of articles in topic j 
xpt  = sample p’s  total production of articles t 
 
Then I calculate if the topics within which the newspaper is specialized are written more or 
less by in-house journalists than average is within this particular newspaper (SI2).  
 
SI2= 
x
x
x
x
i
y
i
q
i
z
i
g  
 
xig  = firm i’s production of articles in a topic within a given governance structure g 
xiz = firm i’s total production of articles within a given topic z 
xiq  = firm i’s production of articles within a given governance structure k 
xiy  = firm i’s total production of articles y 
If SI2=1 there is no difference between degree of in-house coverage of the topics in which 
the firm is specialized an in other topics. This indicates that firms do not focus on core 
competencies. If SI2<0 then newspapers do not focus on core competencies. If SI2>0 it 
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means the firm produce more in house within the topics they are specialized which is a 
confirmation of the core-competence hypothesis. 
 
Finally, I have calculated if these patterns identified at firm level are topic specific. This is 
done by comparing if the newspapers produce more or less in-house compared to average 
within the industry within a given topic (SI3).   
 
SI3 = 
x
x
x
x
p
y
p
q
i
z
i
g  
xig  = firm i’s production of articles in a topic within a given governance structure g 
xiz   = firm i’s total production of articles within a given topic z 
xpq  = sample p’s production of articles in a topic within a given governance structure q 
xpy  =  sample p’s total production of articles y 
 
If SI3=1 there is no difference between degree of in-house coverage of the topics in which 
the firm is specialized an in the average within this topic in the industry. This indicates that 
firms do not focus on what they are specialized in than average is within this topic within the 
industry. If SI3<0 then newspapers focus less on their core competencies than average is 
within the particular topic within the industry. If SI3>0 it means the firm produce more in 
house within the topics they are specialized that the average is within this topic in the 
industry.  
 
 
The quantitative data allow me to identify and unpack patterns in the make or buy practices 
in the newspaper industry. These findings are further unpacked through interviews with 
editor – eight editors were interviewed - on when they choose to ‘make-or-buy’ an article. 
 
6. Empirical findings 
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The question I need to address now is: how widespread is the three different governance 
structures in the news industry? The first finding we can observe in the data set is that the 
hierarchy is the most widespread governance structure in newspaper industry. The majority 
of the newspaper articles – aggregated numbers on industry level - are made in-house (see 
figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Governance structures in Newspapers, industry level,  
 
 
Roughly 3/4 (75,9 percent) of the production of articles with by line is made in house while 
slightly more than 1/10 (respectively 11,6 percent for networks and 12,5 percent are bought 
on the market). This gives a first indication of that newspaper production (i.e. urgent 
production) and hierarchy is positively correlated. Network and market transactions are only 
used seldom. 
 At the aggregate level the large newspapers weight heavily in the sample (and the 
population as such) so we need to see if hierarchy is as dominating if we dichotomizes the 
sample into large and small firms (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Governance structures (dichotomized large/non-large) newspapers  
 
We find that employees make even larger shares of the articles in the large firms than 
average.  80,4 percent of the articles in the large newspapers are made by employees, while 
networks contribute with 9,5 percent. Markets accounts for 10,4 percent.  Thus we find a 
major dominance of hierarchy among the large firms.  However, when we zoom in on small 
newspaper a different picture starts to appear. In small newspapers, employees write lightly 
less than 6/10 articles (58,8 percent) while networks and markets contribute each with 
around 1/5 of the articles (respectively 19,6 percent of the articles are written by networks 
while freelancers write 21,6 percent of the articles). Large newspapers produce on average 
slightly more than 1/5 of their articles in house compared to the small newspapers, but for 
both small and large firms hierarchy is still the most dominant governance structures. 
Compared to the aggregate level the positive correlation between hierarchy and urgency it is 
less clear. But the pattern is different for market transactions and networks, where small 
firms, compared to large ones, have experienced a large growth in the use of networks while 
reducing the importance of market transactions at the same time that the larger ones have 
increased the importance of market transactions. 
  
13
 
The data set allows us to analyze the details at the level too.  
 
Figure 3: Governance structures, firm level 
  
 
Among the large newspapers firm D produces 84,3 of the articles in house while firm C 
produces 73,2 percent in house. Some internal variation exists between the large newspapers 
but the overall pattern is the same; hierarchy is by far the most widespread governance 
structure, while market and networks play only a minor role. For non-large newspapers we 
find that one newspaper – firm B - actually makes fewer articles in house than it buys 
outside the firm boundary (from networks and on the markets).xv In this employees only 
account for 44,1 percent of the articles, while network accounts for 42,2 percent and 
freelancer's journalists - market transactions - for 14,7 percent. Hierarchy is still the most 
used governance structure for this firm compared to the two other governance structures. 
What, however, is striking is that this firm relies highly on networks. Networks produce 42,2 
percent of the articles; this contrasts 9 percent for firm A, 6 percent for firm B, and 5 percent 
for firm C. This means that the use of networks is more than 4-6 times than the other 
newspapers. Due to the very nature of network forms there is a gray zone in both ends, thus 
their actual difference might be influenced by the subjective judgment of the informants of 
say whether a certain subcontractor qualifies to be a network (permlancer) or is a freelancer 
(marked transaction). Despite these modifications, networks seem to be much more used by 
this firm. The last firm, firm A, also relies more on externally produced articles than do the 
large firms, but the vast majority are still produced in-house (66,7 percent).  
The next question I pose is: is there a difference between the different topics in the use of 
the three governance structures, and if this is the case does it have to do with different 
degrees of urgency in the topicsxvi? At the aggregate level (2001) the newspapers 
concentrates their coverage on three areas (see figure 4): economic affairs (32,9 percent of 
the articles), culture (24,1 percent) and politics (21,5 percent), but sport is also important 
with 10,9 percent.  
 
Figure 4: Governance structures and topics  
 
Apart from culture articles, the vast majority of articles within all other topics are written by 
in house staff; the percentage varies from 75,9 percent to 90,9 percent (social affairs) while 
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only 65,5 percentage of culture articles are written in house. Typically around a tenth of the 
articles within the different topics are written by either freelancers (market transactions) or 
perm lancers (network). Important diversions are culture where 17,2 percentage of the 
articles is written by freelancers and 17,2 percentage by perm lancers, and that perm lancers 
are hardly ever used in sports (3,7 percentage).xvii 
Sports and culture stand out in terms of urgency since the newspapers tend to cover events 
which are announced a long time ahead; being football matches, new book, new opera, etc. 
and only a small amount of the articles involve urgent aspects. In house coverage of culture 
displays a different pattern than the other topics (less in house production) but this is not the 
case for sports (81,5 percent), which is close to average. A discussion on why follows 
below. 
When we dichotomize the population into large and small firms (see figure 5), we find – as 
should be expected because small newspapers in general writes less in house – that a smaller 
percentage of all the topics they cover are written in house compared to large newspapers.  
 
Figure 5: Governance structures and topics, population dichotomized in large and small 
 
For example, 65,6 percentage of the economics articles are written by in house staff in the 
small newspapers, while 85,1 percent are written by in house staff in the large ones; for 
politics the numbers are 71,4 percent versus 76,6 percentage (sports cannot be included 
since the small newspapers did not write on sports in this week). But what is striking is that 
the large newspapers maintain a high degree of in house production of culture articles (72,9 
percent) while in the small ones only 30 percent are written in house.  When we look at the 
use of market transactions and network we find that, outside economics and politics, market 
transactions are hardly ever used by the small newspapers, maximum is 10 percent for 
culture (economics and politics are on respectively 25,0 and 28,6 percentage). And outside 
culture, where the majority of the articles are written by perm lancers (60 percentage), and 
social affairs, where 33,3 percentage is written by permlancers, networks are seldom used. 
For the large newspapers market transactions are used slightly more but distributed more 
evenly between the different topics than is the case for the small newspapers. But networks 
are used much more (and again more equally distributed between the different topics) but 
oddly enough networks are used much less in culture (8,3 percentage), which is the area 
where the small newspapers use network most. xviii  
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If we look at the genres, can we find a pattern that can tell us something about urgency and 
governance structures? I have dichotomized the population into two categories: news articles 
(often urgent) and analytical (seldom urgent); this is naturally a rather rough proxy since we 
find many news articles with a low degree of urgency in evaporation (though almost always 
in use) while analytical articles often are urgent in use and/or evaporation, nevertheless the 
majority of the news articles tends to be urgent while the majority of the analytical articles 
tends to be less-urgent (often written the day after a major event). At the aggregate level 
(2001) – see figure 6 - we find that in house journalists are used slightly more (5,8 percent 
points) when newspapers write a news article than they write an analytical article. 
 
Figure 6. Governance structures crossed with genre in Newspapers, industry level  
 
72,9 percent of the analytical articles is made in house, while 78,6 percentage of the news 
articles is made in house (average is 76,6 percentage). Markets transactions are used more 
for analytical articles than for news articles (15,3 versus 10,4 percentage), while network 
transactions amounts to roughly the same (11,8 versus 11 percentage).  
In the same vein we can see if there is a correlation between newspapers topic-specialization 
and use of governance structures. This links to the discussion about focus on core 
competencies (using specialization index as a proxy for whether firms focus on core 
competencies); and secondly it links to the discussion of whether in house core 
competencies are a precondition for outsourcing since it reduces the information and/or 
knowledge asymmetry between the subcontractor and the customer. This reduction is 
important under temporal specificity, where time to search for an independent contractor and 
verify his articles content is highly limited.  What does the statistics say? First we compare 
firm-specialization (compared to industry level) and governance structures. What is striking 
(see figure 7) is that firm A, B, C each has one area with a high degree of specialization; 
firm D does not display any significant specialization.  
 For firm A its specialization is in economics (specialization index is 2,6) while firm B is 
specialized in culture (with a specialization index on 2,0), firm C is almost equally 
specialized in politics (1,6) and in culture (1,3). Thus it makes sense to claim that 
newspapers display a certain degree of topic specialization. But do they focus on core 
competencies and outsource in other areas? In the areas where they are specialized the use of 
in house staff is relatively less compared to the industry average. Firm A has a core 
hierarchy index of 0,9 (economics), firm B of 0,5 (culture) and firm C on respectively 0,9 
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(politics) and 1,0 (culture). This means that they are more inclined to outsource in the topics 
where they are more specialized than average within this topic in the industry. We cannot 
identify a clear pattern in the outsourcing of the specialized activities when it comes to 
replacing hierarchy by either market or network. Firm A tends to outsource to markets (spc. 
index 3 of 2,6 in economics) while network is used seldom (specialization index 3 of 0,6 in 
economics). Firm B hardly ever uses markets (comparatively, that is) for specialized 
activities while it often uses network.  
 However, this hints strongly that firms do not focus on core competencies and outsource 
other activities. Moreover, it suggests that in house competencies are needed for outsourcing 
in this context, knowing whom is not sufficient to replace know how. However, we still 
need to demonstrate that the individual firm’s specialization is not a typical firm pattern but 
a pattern that is different from the average use of outsourcing in the firm. Firm A is so 
highly specialized in economics that for technical reasons one should not expect to find a 
difference between use of outsourcing in economics and the firm average. Hence, we find 
that ‘make’ (spec. index 2) for economics is 1,0 while the ‘buy’ index is 1,0 and  ‘network’ 
index is 1,1. But when turning to firm B and C we find that ‘make’ is used less than average 
in culture in firm B, and culture and politics in firm C. Firm B tends to use network contacts 
within the topics where it is specialized while markets are used less than average is in the 
newspaper. For firm C we find that they use networks more than average in politics (spec. 
index 2 on 2,5) while they use markets much less (0,3), however in culture we find that 
market transactions is the one where there is a positive difference from average in the firm 
(spe. index 2 on 2,3) while network is less than average.  
  
Finally, we will draw our attention to geography in the sense that urgency 
manifests itself differently depending on geography. The majority of the investments the 
firms have made in coverage are – measured in output articles – in domestic affairs. Around 
eight out of ten articles (80,9 percentage) are about domestic affairs leaving 2 out of ten 
articles (19,1 percentage) for international affairs, and Denmark is a tiny little country with a 
population of five millions in an area of 42.000 square meters. Hence apart from few places 
outside Denmark the newspapers do not have sufficient economy of scale for having a full 
time journalist stationed there. This means that if an urgent event occurs outside Denmark, 
the way it is reported suggests a connection between hierarchy and geography. If the 
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benefits of hierarchy in coping with urgency were independent of geography (transportation 
time versus search time), we should find the same pattern in the distribution in the use of the 
three different governance structures within domestic and foreign affairs. However, if this is 
not the case we showed that geography modifies the efficiency of hierarchy. In both 
domestic and foreign affairs we find that the majority of articles are made in house (see 
figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Governance structures crossed with geography, industry level 
 
 
82,2 percentage of the domestic articles are made in house while 61,7 of the foreign affairs 
articles are made in house. In domestic affairs 10,5 percentage of the rest of the articles are 
made by freelance journalists (market transactions) while only 7,3 are made by permlancers 
(network). Furthermore, newspapers tends to rely more on network for foreign affairs where 
21,7 of the articles are made by permlancers and 16,6 are made by freelancers.  The chi-
square test indicates that hierarchy is used significantly less – on 3 star levels – in foreign 
affairs than is the case in domestic affairs.  
 
7. Match with existing theories 
 
I will now turn to discuss the match between the empirics and the predictions/explanations 
on ‘make-or-buy’ from the knowledge-based theory of the firm and transaction cost 
economics. The first question I wish to discuss is whether we can say that firms focus on 
core competencies, thus behave in accordance with the knowledge-based view of the firm. 
As explained the knowledge-based view of the firm argues that firms specialize in 
(integrate) their core competencies and outsource activities where they do not hold core 
competencies.  If one accepts that it can be tested on the empirical hypothesis that 
newspapers use employees within the topics where the highest frequency of publications and 
use either free- or permlancers in the less important topics, then the empirical study shows 
that firms tends to specialize their activities. But when one compares the use of alternative 
governance structures on core and non-core topics, then nothing seems to indicate that firms 
use integration more in core areas than in non-core topics. Hierarchy is the most widespread 
governance mechanism in all newspapers. But the use of hierarchy is more widespread in 
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larger firms than in smaller firms but this is a general phenomenon not related to specific 
core competencies. Interviews with the editors on the smaller newspapers revealed that they 
wished to use integration more but it is beyond their financial possibilities. Thus we might 
refer to it as that they do not have sufficient economy of scale to use hierarchy as much as 
they wish. What seems to play at least a certain role in determining whether a newspaper 
uses integration or non-integration is the urgency dimension of the topics. Topics where 
prescheduled (i.e. low-urgent) events are less prevalent than in the others do find some 
support in the fact that newspapers use integration more widespread in urgent areas than in 
low-urgent topics; this last aspect is amplified when one compares larger to smaller firms. 
This, however, is only supported by one topic (culture) but not sports (which is the other 
topic with a high degree of prescheduled events). Why this difference exists and what the 
implications are is difficult to identify. One can speculate about it and I suggest that sports 
has until recently been mainly descriptive (as opposed to analytical) where culture has been 
analytical, thus there has been better external learning environment-advantages associated 
with culture. Universities are filled with art professors who wish to write to the newspapers 
(and almost for free) and authors (who do not want to write for free) that are skilled 
analytics too. This external environment does not exist in sports. Sportsmen usually have not 
been skilled writers and universities are not providing a pool of knowledge within this topic, 
which has the same size.xix However, this explanation is partial since it cannot explain why 
firms do not use independent contractors more when the reduced payment is taken into 
account.xx One possible explanation that has been mentioned is that covering sports is a 
wrong career move, since it is considered very little prestigious, thus freelance journalists 
would not opt for working within this field (and the waste majority of freelance journalist do 
not have special competencies in covering sports either).  Why do the newspapers not use 
only independent contractors in low-urgent topics? First, sometimes urgency is prevalent 
within low-urgent topics, thus a minimum staff might be needed if one buys the urgency 
argument. The data cannot say if the urgency dimension is sufficient to explain the size of 
the in house staff in low urgent topics. The differences between small and larger newspapers 
seem to indicate that this is not the case. However, larger newspapers do cover more urgent 
events within culture than smaller newspapers do so it provides a partial explanation. One 
possible additional explanation argues that newspapers need a minimum staff to sustain a 
minimum critical mass to be able to develop new ideas, link different topics to each other, 
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and in general develop an absorptive capacity for external knowledge: an absorptive 
capacity that allows the newspapers to make external knowledge relevant to the firm. 
Moreover, the existence of external learning environments – which delivers knowledge 
either at a low cost or for free – also reduces the advantages of focusing on core 
competencies, since newspapers will never be able to create learning environments that 
‘resembles’ those at the universities. This is, first of all, a resource question since 
universities receive far more financial resources.  However, the existence of this type of an 
external learning environment is not sufficient to explain why firm mainly rely on 
integration/hierarchy, since the firm could still consist of one editor only who uses 
independent contractors (freelancers) to take advantage of the ‘external’ environment. Later 
I will return to why I suggest that urgency is important in answering this question, despite 
one cannot claim a simple linear relationship between urgency and integration.  
The existence of external learning environments links back to the question of journalists 
need for firm specific knowledge. Is it because of the need for firm specific knowledge that 
firms integrate, thus does the core competence refers to the need to be in possession of firm 
specific knowledge? The interviews with editors seem not to support this, since the 
differences between the competencies between the newspapers are minor. The journalists 
can write for all newspaper with limited training time and produce front-page articles after 
being hired only for a short while; even trainees can write front-page articles. Many aspects 
of the products are also codified – published articles - hence non-employees can analyze and 
learn the demands from the newspaper. Sub-firm specific micro competencies are needed in 
newspaper-production. Integration/hierarchy can also be explained with reference to micro 
competencies and firm buzz (Storper and Venables 2002). These micro competencies refer 
to that the journalist and editor need to know each other, both for the journalist to be able to 
respond fast to the editor’s wishes and for the editor and journalist to function socially 
together in an environment characterized by a high degree of stress. Access to firm buzz is 
also a precondition for knowing what is on the agenda, which needs not to be codified in 
newspapers. However, these two explanations of integration more points towards need for 
being present than for certain core competencies.   
Even if we accept a need for certain firm specific competencies/knowledge, 
then this hardly explains the use of integration/hierarchy since the needed firm specific 
competencies can be acquired through being employed in a minor short period (a few years 
  
20
 
for example).  This is possible because the newspaper firms do not change their products 
frequently. 
 What are the implications for knowledge-based view of the firm? The study does 
challenge the notion that the use of alternative governance structures is determined by 
internal specialization advantages. Firms simply do not specialize according to the 
predictions. The study does support the knowledge-based view of the firm that development 
of an absorptive capacity is needed to take advantage of external learning environments, as 
well as indicates that a minimum critical in house knowledge mass is needed. Moreover, the 
study also indicates that a firm needs to have internal competencies in-house before they can 
outsource activities within this field. Hence, they cannot focus on core competencies only.  
Urgency enforces this since firms do not have the time to use external sources to verify the 
content of articles (where they do not know/trust the journalist), thus they need to have 
competent in house journalists capable of doing it. 
 
7.2 Transaction Cost Economics and the Newspaper Industry 
 
The first question we need to ask is: can integration be explained as solutions to hold up? As 
explained transaction cost economics says that knowledge and temporal specificity 
generates potential for hold up or subcontractors refrain from undertaking the activity, thus 
it leads to integration. In the news industry this means that newspapers use employees 
because they – in case they were perm - or freelancers – would posses competencies (know 
how) that would allow then to make hold up on the newspaper. Or newspapers use 
employees because freelancers can make a hold up and demand more in payment by 
threatening to delay the submission of the article.  
 The study does not suggest that integration is to be understood as a solution to hold up from 
free- or permlance journalists. Few journalists possess know how that allow them to make a 
hold up in the long run. Most articles follow a industry specific standard; not a firm specific. 
The first section of the three largest newspapers are written according to same skeleton 
which is the classical news articles (structured after decreasing importance), same lix-
number, etc, where the main difference is the angle of the story, use daily language, not 
abstract language; show it, do not tell it-techniques, and so forth. There are hardly any 
demands for interfaces between the articles, nor is it impossible to break with the 
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dominating style of the newspaper. The articles can be written well by most journalists. 
Hence, an editor can easily find a replacement. This however naturally includes search time 
and eventually verification time. In other words the degree of knowledge specificity is 
highly limited, thus hold up is not prevalent, but one could still argue that urgency prevented 
the editor from finding another freelance journalist, thus the journalist could make a hold up 
on the newspaper (temporal specificity). But the possibility of using this threat is reduced by 
the fact that the freelance journalists need to engage in continuous interactions with 
newspapers/editors to sustain a minimum standard of living, hence even if they have good 
opportunities to make a hold up – demanding double payments, for example – this is not a 
suitable strategy since they might succeed in this once (say if the newspaper really needs the 
article for tomorrow’s edition). A freelance journalist needs to sell more than ten articles a 
month to have just a decent standard of living. In short repeated interaction reduces the hold 
up potential despite temporal dependency. This is further reduced by the tendency of 
journalist not to possess non-replaceable skill. As a rescue-operation most freelance 
journalist can be partially replaced by the use of bureaus notes (or translations of articles 
from foreign newspapers).  
A final point, which I will draw attention to, is that there is a distinction between transaction 
costs and production costs. This distinction is the foundation for transaction costs economics 
and it is a dualism that seems problematic for urgent production (and other kinds of 
production too (see Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Brusoni et al. 2001xxi) since search costs or 
search time cannot be reduced to transactions but are deeply influenced by the production 
costs, to keep it in transaction costs terminology. The firms do the majority of outsourcing in 
areas where they have specialized (in terms of by-line articles) since under urgency they do 
not have much time to identify (discover new independent contractors), search for (find 
those independent contractors they have used previous) and verify the content of articles 
submitted by the independent contractors since if they did spend a significant time to verify 
the content, for example, other competitors might get the information about the idea (as it is 
called: do not test your story until it dies, journalist) or somebody else might just be able to 
publish it before (or certain firms might be able to run damage control). If we add a 
distinction from the knowledge-based literature between know whom and know how, 
investment in the first two aspects of transactions (discovery and true search) these might - 
to a reasonable extent - be reduced to investments in transactions – that is to know who to 
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contact. This does not necessary depend on the production costs, since background checks of 
the independent contractors can be made based on rather transparent and simple criteria: 
where do they publish, which topics, where have they been quoted, etc., and this ‘market for 
independent contractors’-search and discovery can be done continuously (not only when 
something urgent occurs). But when something has to be verified fast (because of urgency) 
before it can be published, then the editors need to have certain competencies in house to be 
able to judge the quality and correctness of the articles submitted, hence transactions in this 
case become dependent on production costs. This, I believe, is even more widespread in 
markets where reliability/trustworthiness is important such as in ‘serious newspapers’ as 
included in this population than in so-called tabloids (much closer to entertainment). xxii One 
assumption above is that we talk about by-line articles; newspapers can without any 
problems in terms of search and verification outsource to bureau’s since they tend to be 
available to all newspapers; that is the case for Reuters, Ritzau, APP, etc., where different 
subscriptions arrangements occur but shared for all of them are that they don’t contribute – 
much – to the different newspapers competitiveness since they are available to all other 
newspapers too. xxiii  What are the implications for TCE?   Depending on how one read TCE 
this story has different implications. I suggest seeing it as challenging TCE in two ways. 
First, firm specific knowledge is limited and not the source of hold up. Temporal specificity 
does include some degree of temporal specificity, however, due to the need for repeated 
interaction between the journalist and the editor/newspaper hold up are very unlikely to be 
the reason behind integration.  Moreover, the dependency of in house competencies does 
challenge the idea that production costs and transaction costs can be separated. The costs of 
using the market depends on the in house competencies that are build up through direct 
participation in the production. 
  
6.4 Urgency and integration  
 
We will now turn to explore how far urgency can explain the widespread of integration. 
Newspapers have to collect many articles everyday that are not planned ahead despite that 
some are planned or continuations of previous published articles. Lets say it takes an editor 
on average five minutes of communication time pr. article with employees, assuming the 
editor has to collect 50 articles a day (these numbers are based on interviews with editors). If 
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we do not include advantages of firm specific knowledge to employees versus independent 
contractors, we will find that if just every second independent contractor is occupied to other 
side – he has more customers because he does not want to be exposed to hold up - this will 
result in extended search and communications time. In pure communication time this means 
he has to spend - if we only have one editor taking care of this task - 6,25 hours 
communicating to journalists instead of communicating only 4,2 hours. That means it will 
take roughly two hours more for the same editor to collect the same number of articles, and 
that is under conditions that favors the independent contractor more than is the case in the 
real world, where needed communication time with employees is smaller than for 
independent contractors, as we will turn to soon. But the savings because of reduced 
payment pr. article could finance several editors that could do the searching. Based on 
standard payment a newspaper could hire more than 15 additional editors, thus should have 
more than sufficient economic reasons to use this model. Since they are capable of making 
this simple calculation themselves, we need to find the answer to why they do not 
somewhere else.  
But couldn't this be made by networks instead, so that the newspaper could 
take advantages of the higher-powered incentives and low costs outside the firm and still 
remain flexible for several reasons? If the networks had two customers, couldn't the event 
that should be covered be predicted, so it could be planned ahead a conflict with the network 
so to avoid extended search time. It is difficult to say exactly how much can be planned 
ahead, what the costs of planning ahead eventually would be in terms of value loss because 
of not catching events that evaporated fast or were published by competitors before oneself. 
This way of reasoning comes close to Coase’s (1972, Winter 1991) argument for integration: 
it allows for the use of direction. The editor (boss) can tell the journalist to go and cover 
event X. Coase, however, never pointed to the importance of time/urgency in his text but 
only to that price-signals were not sufficient. There are also limitations to the use of 
direction. Above it is assumed that there is a correspondence between the interests of the 
employees and the employer or that employee outside options are so limited that they accept 
doing things against their interests. But is it a problem with employees with good outside 
options in the sense that it prevents events from being covered? It is hard to give a simple 
answer to this question since it depends naturally on the individual employee's competencies 
but also on conjuncture within the industry, where low conjuncture lead to fewer outside 
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options for employees in general but maybe less so for those possessing certain specialized 
skills; it depends as hinted at on specialization and it depends on the firm, some firms are 
better capable of attracting employees with attractive outside options; they can offer higher 
salaries, better working conditions, and more time for investigative journalism. In the large 
firms the high degree of specialization among the journalists tends to minimize these 
conflicts but less so on the smaller newspapers. However, the information asymmetry 
between editor and journalist also tends to make this problem less outspoken in the sense 
that the journalist is often the specialist in his field and knows more about what happens in 
the field than his editor. Thus if there are events he does not want to cover he can choose not 
to inform the editor about their existence, or twist the information so that another event 
seems more important. Using this kind of information asymmetry strategically for the 
journalist depends on his knowledge, on what competing journalists will publish, on the 
topic, since he can run into problems if the other newspaper runs articles that the journalist 
didn't want to do for his own reasons.  
The question of hierarchy also crucially depends on the way journalism is 
made nowadays, not on journalism as such. First, as explained above the newspapers tends 
to compete on being fast as opposed to analytical, apparently the value of being fast is 
considered higher than 'adding' value to an event in term of writing in dept on the topic, thus 
using specialized journalists does not add significant value to the product.  It is claimed that 
for the mainstream reader adding analytical content to articles might even work 
counterproductive, since these readers will then consider the articles ‘too heavy’ or ‘too 
long’.  Finally, one should add that urgency cannot explain it alone. It cannot explain why 
sports articles are not written solely by freelance or permlance journalists. Moreover, 
urgency can only limitedly explain why larger newspapers do use integration more 
widespread than small one.  
  
7. Conclusion and further research 
 
In this paper I conclude that newspapers are organized differently than is predicted from the 
knowledge-based view of the firm and transaction cost economics. The newspapers do no 
specialize in core competencies measured in terms of topics covered. On the contrary, a 
precondition for outsourcing is good competencies in house. The widespread use of 
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integration cannot either be explained as a solution to hold up either. Hold up is not 
widespread in the industry because of absence of need for firm specific knowledge and that 
temporal dependency is being annulled be repeated interaction. Partly, urgency provides an 
explanation as to why integration is so widespread. Under urgency firms need to be able to 
respond fast. Integration provides as solution to this since it eliminates the search time that is 
needed to use market transactions because of the possibility to use direction. The efficiency 
of direction is modified by physical distance and employees outside options.   
 The conclusions are based on the newspaper industry only, thus need to be tested in 
mass media-industries before they can be generalized. Moreover, there is a need for 
additional research on the functioning of market for information goods characterized by a 
high degree of urgency. Inspired by Knight one can suggest that markets for news articles 
(as inputs to newspapers) hardly exists because the need to be sold the same day as produced 
and this involves to high a degree of risk for the freelance journalist. While the payment for 
articles are higher for investigative journalism investigative journalism involves a high 
degree of uncertainty about the outcome of the product. Hence, the risk might be to large for 
a freelancer to carry.  The newspaper can better run risks.  
 Finally, production planning (Richardson 2002) provides some insights that are to be 
developed. From this perspective the ‘make-or buy’ question can be said to center around 
the size of the output and its implications. Integration from this perspective equals a fixed 
cost which capacity should be utilized to a full extent. If not utilized the investment might 
not pay off. This points to that stability in the demand for a certain good should influence 
the ‘make-or-buy’ decision. Derived from this, one can argue that firm should not rely on 
internal production for satisfying peak demands since the firm will stand with an unrealized 
fixed cost afterwards.  The existence of a certain fixed cost – in house capacity – would then 
lead to the use of internal staff even when better alternative market options exists. This, I 
suggest, can be linked to newspaper production and addressing questions like: how does the 
firm existence of an internal capacity for coping with situations with a high degree of 
urgency affect the use of in house staff when there are less urgency. And how does the 
existence of in house journalists affect the production of ideas for articles, subsequently their 
execution. These questions follow naturally after posing the make or buy-questions as done 
in this paper. 
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FIGURES: 
 
Figure 1: Governance structures in Newspapers, industry level 
 
 Frequency 
2001 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent (a)* 
Hierarchy 197 73,9 75,9 
Market 33 12,2 12,5 
Network 30 11,3 11,6 
Total 260 97,4 100,0 
Missing 7 2,6  
Tot incl. Missing 267 100,0  
* Including all newspapers 
 
 
Figure 2: Governance structures (dichotomized large/non-large) newspapers 
 
 
Firm size 
Governance structure Percent Valid Percent (a) Valid Percent (b) 
Non-large Hierarchy 53,3 58,8 58,8 
  Market 19,6 21,6 21,6 
  Network 17,8 19,6 19,6 
  Total 90,7 100,0 100,0 
  Missing 9,3 
    100,0 
Large Hierarchy 79,9 80,4 84,3 
  Market 10,1 10,1 6,9 
  Network 9,4 9,5 8,8 
  Total 99,4 100,0 100,0 
  Missing 0,6 
    100,0 
 
Figure 3: Governance structures, firm level  
 
 
  
Firm 
Governance structure Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Firm A (non-large) Hierarchy 24 58,3 66,7 
 Market 9 22,2 25,4 
 Network 3 6,9 7,9 
 Total 35 87,5 100,0 
  Missing 5 12,5  
 40 100,0  
Firm B (non-large) Hierarchy 8 42,9 44,1 
 Market 3 14,3 14,7 
  Network 8 40,0 41,2 
  Total 19 97,1 100,0 
  Missing 1 2,9   
  20 100,1  
Firm C (large) Hierarchy 53 71,9 73,2 
 Market 12 15,8 16,1 
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  Network 8 10,5 10,7 
  Total 73 98,2 100,0 
  Missing 1 1,8 
   74 100,0 
Firm D (large) Hierarchy 112 84,3 84,3 
 Market 9 6,9 6,9 
  Network 12 8,8 8,8 
  Total 133 100,0 100,0 
 Missing    
 
 
Figure 4: Governance structures and topics 
 
 Economics  Politics Sport Crime Social Science Culture 
Hierarchy 78,2% 75,9% 81,5 % 88,9 90,9 85,7 65,5 
Market 10,3% 11,8% 14,8 % 0 0 14,3 17,2 
Hybrid  11,5% 12,2% 3,7 % 11,1 9,1 0 17,2 
 
 
Figure 5: Governance structures and topics, population dichotomized in large and small 
  
 Economics Politics Sport Crime Social Science Culture 
Small        
Hierarchy 65,6% 71,4 0 0 66,7 100 30 
Market 25,0% 28,6 0 0 0 0 10 
Network 9,4% 0 0 0 33,3 0 60 
Large     
Hierarchy 85,1% 76,6 81,5 88,9 100 83,3 72,9 
Market 0 8,5 14,8 0 0 16,7 18,8 
Network 14,9% 14,9 3,7 11,1 0 0 8,3 
 
 
Figure 6: Governance structures crossed with genre in newspapers, industry level 
 
 Analysis News Total Chi-square 
Hierarchy 62 129 191  
Ns 
 
(0.497,  
Df 2) 
 72,9% 78,6% 76,7%  
Market 13 17 30 
 15,3% 10,4% 12,0% 
Network 10 18 28  
  11,8% 11,0% 11,2% 
  85 164 249 
  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Figure 7  
 
Firm A 
Spc. 
Index 1  
Spc. 
Index 2 
(‘Make’) 
Spc. 
Index 2 
(‘Buy’) 
Spc. Index 
2 
(‘Network’)  
Spc. 
Index 3 
(‘Make’) 
Spc. 
Index 3 
(‘Buy‘) 
Spc. Index 
3 
(‘Network’)
Eco 2,6  1,0 1,0 1,1  0,9 2,6 0,6
culture 0,2  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
social 1,3  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
science 0,5  1,5 0,0 0,0  1,2 0,0 0,0
crime 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
politics 0,3  1,0 1,3 0,0  0,9 3,0 0,0
sport 0,4  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
          
Firm B          
Eco 0,4  0,7 2,2 0,8  0,4 3,2 2,9
Culture 2,0  0,7 0,7 1,5  0,5 0,6 3,5
Social 3,4  1,6 0,0 0,8  0,7 0,0 3,7
science 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
Crime 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
Politics 0,0  1,3 2,7 0,0  0,8 3,6 0,0
Sport 2,1  0,0 0,0 0,0  0,0 0,0 0,0
          
Firm C          
Eco 0,4  1,2 0,0 0,9  1,1 0,0 1,0
Culture 1,3  0,9 2,3 0,0  1,0 1,9 0,0
Social 0,5  1,3 0,0 0,0  1,1 0,0 0,0
science 1,4  0,7 3,7 0,0  0,6 3,5 0,0
Crime 1,1  1,3 0,0 0,0  1,1 0,0 0,0
Politics 1,6  0,9 0,3 2,5  0,9 0,4 2,2
Sport 1,0  1,3 0,0 0,0  1,2 0,0 0,0
          
Firm D          
Eco 0,9  1,0 0,0 1,4  1,1 0,0 1,1
Culture 0,9  0,9 1,4 1,5  1,1 0,6 0,8
Social 1,2  1,2 0,0 0,0  1,1 0,0 0,0
science 1,1  1,2 0,0 0,0  1,2 0,0 0,0
Crime 1,4  1,0 0,0 1,9  0,9 0,0 1,5
Politics 0,9  1,1 1,7 0,8  1,2 1,1 0,6
Sport 1,4  0,9 2,9 0,6  0,9 1,4 1,4
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Figure 8: Governance structures crossed with geography, industry level 
 
 Home Foreign Total Chi-square 
Hierarchy 
 
157 37 194 *** 
 
(0,002,Df 2) 
 
 82,2% 61,7% 77,3%  
Market 20 10 30 
  10,5% 16,6% 12,0% 
Network 14 13 27 
  7,3% 21,7% 10,7% 
  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i Information on the individual journalists were presented to me in an anonymous way. This was a 
necessity since contractual relationships are confidential.  The procedure for collecting the information is 
described in the methodological chapter. 
ii On the other hand, the news industry is unique is several ways.  At least in Europe it is only recently 
that the news industry has become strongly profit motivated (apart from the tabloids). The newspapers have 
often had an ideological foundation – and eventually a formal connection to a political party, trade union, or 
similar – which has placed limitations on their possibilities for experimentation. For example newspapers 
closely associated with the trade unions have not had ‘good’ possibilities for experimenting with the use of 
freelancers.   
iii Tabloids are excluded. 
iv More specifically, I have interviewed editors at magazines that were published weekly and monthly. 
This was done to contrast the statements made by editors at the newspaper since the magazines have a 
shorter degree of temporal specificity in use (and often also in acquisition). Originally, I intended to make a 
comparative study between newspapers and magazines – because of their different degree of temporal 
specificity - but no suitable cases existed.   
v These include both trade unions, associations of publishers, etc.  
vi This statement refers to newspapers included in the study. 
vii For a critique of this definition, see James Jr (1998, 2000) 
viii This included fixed formal rule/payment for overtime and similar. 
ix Most often the freelance journalist will not get formal feedback but the placement of the article in the 
newspaper, and so forth, signals the value the editors has attributed to it. 
x Bureau notes are not included. They do not contribute to the different newspapers sustained 
competitive advantage.   
xi This choice can naturally be critized along lines as the topic in which the public most is not 
necessary the most important to the newspapers survival, etc.  
xii I didn’t include bureau notices in the measurement, which can be criticized, but I didn’t for three 
reasons. There are many and they are small thus it would be highly time consuming and they wouldn’t be 
comparable to by-line articles. However, firms don’t compete on them since they are available to all 
newspapers. But they do affect governance structures.. I didn’t include necrologies and similar either. 
xiii To avoid that the stratifying of the sample affects the final results I have weighted this ‘out’ in the 
data. Weight was measured as: (PF/SF)*(ST/PT) where PF is part of population, PT is population in total, SF 
is part of sample and ST is sample in total (see empirical chapter for example on calculation). 
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xiv As will be shown later demands for firm specific knowledge is highly limited, hence from a 
knowledge-based theory analytical article is expected to be written by perm- or freelance journalists 
affiliated with external learning environments specialised within a certain topics. 
xv Networks are calculated as being outside the firm. 
xvi The reason behind introducing urgency here is that I will return to this concept later on. 
xvii Crime and social affairs are suffering from rather few observations, thus I do not place too much 
emphasis on the low numbers of market transactions.  
xviii Due to the low number of observations in some topics we cannot run non-parametric tests here. 
xix The question of why culture and sports, at least until recently, have had a different need for 
analytical articles is beyond the scope of this paper but it might not be wrong to assume that it is being read 
by different segments. 
xx Typically, a freelance receives less than 2/3 of the payment an in house journalist gets for an 
identical article. Differences occur within them and some newspapers pay perm- and freelance relatively 
higher than their employees. The calculation is based on averages payment reported for perm- and freelance 
journalists versus average monthly payment for employees in the same newspaper divided by the number 
of articles published by the employees (employees without additions job description apart from writing 
articles). Since rent for office, sick leave, education etc is not included the real difference is larger. 
xxi I will limit my comments to the problems stemming from urgency.  
xxii Is not this a return to asset specificity? I don’t claim above, as will be clear below, that asset 
specificity is not important but that hold up-problems are not important. Moreover, I suggest below that 
there are higher degrees of asset specificity in micro social competencies than in intellectual competencies 
but that these don’t generate hold up’s.  
xxiii I have not included bureau notes; mainly the newspapers use them for small notes, not full articles. 
However, if one – for example – measures percentages of square meter of newspaper-pages that was written 
in house versus outsourced – including bureau’s – the one would get a pattern suggesting that outsourcing 
is more important than I suggest. However, for reason of competitiveness, I suggest to focus on by-line 
articles.    
